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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals trom a conviction for unlawfiil possession of methamphetamine, a 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (2002). 
sj1 MTIMI^N i o r Tin; rsMir* 
Does defendant's claim that officers lacked probable cause to detain him for a 
warrants check require reversal where the trial court's conclusion that defendant was not 
detained is unchallenged on appeal 
detention? 
^t-jtiaarci uj i\cv;cv.. . •::. . jurt reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying 
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a mo: ' ; ^ •. v< uuo 
8, 6 P.3d 1133. The Court "review[s] the trial court's conclusions of law based on these 
findings for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of 
the legal standard to the facts." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
The State charged defendant with unlawful possession of methamphetamine, a third 
degree felony. R. 3-4. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from his person in 
a search incident to arrest. R. 45-57. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the 
motion. R. 68-69,102. Following a bench trial, defendant was found guilty as charged. R. 
79-80. The trial court sentenced defendant to a prison term of zero-to-five years, suspended 
the prison term, and ordered defendant to serve 365 days in jail as part of supervised 
probation. R. 95-97. Defendant timely appealed. R. 98-99. 
In an apparent oversight, the trial judge did not sign the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law submitted by the prosecutor after the suppression hearing. See R. 81-82 
("Proposed Findings and Conclusions"). After defendant appealed and filed his opening 
brief, and on motion of the State, this Court remanded for entry of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. R. 114-21,123. The trial court thereafter entered Amended Findings of 
2 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. 128-30 ("Amended Findings and Conclusions"). The trial 
court entered the following conclusions of law: 
1. The defendant voluntarily stepped outside to speak to the officers, 
which constituted a level one encounter that did not require reasonable 
suspicion. 
2. The officers did not detain the defendant in the course of their 
investigation. 
3. The defendant was lawfully arrested on the arrest warrants and was 
subject to search pursuant to arrest. 
R. 130. The foregoing conclusions were identical to those set forth in the Proposed Findings 
and Conclusions, see R. 82, and were consistent with the trial court's oral ruling that 
defendant "willingly went outside" and that the officers did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by conducting the "knock and talk[ ]," R. 104: 63. Consistent with this Court's 
order on remand, the trial court made more complete findings in the Amended Findings and 
Conclusions than the findings set forth in the Proposed Findings and Conclusions. Compare 
R. 128-29 withR. 81-82. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
Officer Ron Bruno of the Salt Lake City Police Department received information that 
Albert Phillips—a suspect in an auto theft ring—was staying in two motor homes parked at a 
large warehouse divided into several auto-related businesses. R. 104: 5-9, 20, 30. Officer 
Bruno and Officer Jay Bieber drove to the location in an effort to locate the suspect. R. 104: 
9-10, 34; R. 128: ^ 1. Officer Bruno approached the door of one of the motor homes, 
knocked on the door, and identified himself as a police officer. R. 104: 10; R. 128: f^ 2. 
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Defendant—who was not the suspect—answered the door. R. 104: 10, 34-35; R. 128: f 2. 
Officer Bruno again identified himself and asked defendant if he would step outside to speak 
with him. R. 104: 10-13; R. 129: f 3. Defendant agreed and stepped outside voluntarily. R. 
104: 11, 35; R. 129: ^ J 4. The officers did not pull defendant out of the trailer or otherwise 
touch defendant. See R. 104: 11, 35; R. 129:14. 
Officer Bruno explained that he was investigating an auto theft and asked defendant 
for his name and date of birth. R. 104: 11-12, 35; R. 129: ffif 5-6. Defendant provided the 
information, and while Officer Bruno continued his conversation with defendant, Officer 
Bieber radioed dispatch requesting a warrants check. R. 104: 13, 35-37; R. 129: fflf 5, 7. 
Officer Bruno asked defendant if he knew the suspect, if he knew where the suspect might 
be, and for any information that might help the officer locate him. R. 104: 14; R. 129: f 6. 
Defendant confirmed that he knew the suspect and that he had seen the suspect at that 
location, but denied knowledge of defendant's present whereabouts. R. 104: 14. 
Meanwhile, dispatch informed Officer Bieber that defendant had an outstanding warrant for 
his arrest. See R. 104: 14-15, 37-38, 43; R. 129: \ 8. After Officer Bieber notified Officer 
Bruno of that fact, defendant was arrested on the outstanding warrant. R. 104: 14-15,38; R. 
129: If 9. 
Upon defendant's arrest, Officer Bruno asked defendant if he wanted him to secure 
the motor home for him. R. 104:15. Defendant responded affirmatively and told the officer 
where he could find the keys inside the motor home. R. 104:15. Officer Bruno retrieved the 
keys, locked the motor home, and placed the keys in defendant's pocket. R. 104: 15-16; R. 
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129: If 12. At defendant's request, Officer Bruno also retrieved some shoes for defendant, 
who was wearing none at the time of his arrest. R. 104: 16, 22, 42; R. 129: fflf 11-12. 
Officer Bieber frisked defendant for weapons, finding "some miscellaneous stuff but no 
weapons. R. 104:39,43; R. 129: [^ 10 Officer Bieber then placed defendant in his patrol car 
and transported him to the jail. R. 104: 40; R. 129: f 13. 
After preparing a booking information sheet, Officer Bieber assisted Deputy England 
in escorting defendant to the booking area for a search. R. 104: 40. Deputy England 
recovered apackage of cigarettes from defendant's pocket. R. 104:40,46-48; R. 129: ^ f 13. 
An examination of the cigarette package uncovered a small baggy containing 
methamphetamine. R. 104: 40-41; R. 129:] 13. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that the officers' alleged detention of him was not supported by 
probable cause. However, because the trial court concluded that defendant was not detained, 
and defendant has not challenged that conclusion, this Court need not address defendant's 
claim. In any event, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant was not detained— 
nothing in the circumstances suggested that defendant was not free to disregard their requests 
and go about his business. Moreover, even assuming defendant had been detained, an 
investigatory detention does not require probable cause, as argued by defendant. 
Defendant's additional claim that the contraband was planted on him is also 
unavailing because that allegation was affirmatively waived below. In any event, an 
appellate court does not make new factual findings. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT OFFICERS LACKED PROBABLE 
CAUSE TO DETAIN HIM FOR A WARRANTS CHECK DOES NOT 
COMPEL REVERSAL BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S 
CONCLUSION THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT DETAINED IS 
UNCHALLENGED 
The trial court found that after defendant answered the door, Officer Bruno asked him 
"if he would step outside to speak with him." R. 129: fflf 2-3. The court found that "[t]he 
officers did not touch the defendant at this time and did not pull the defendant out of the 
trailer/5 but that defendant "stepped outside on his own volition to talk to them." R. 129: f 4. 
The court also found that "[u]pon [the officers'] request, the defendant provided [them] with 
his name and date of birth." R. 129: f 5. Based on these findings, the trial court concluded 
that "[t]he officers did not detain the defendant in the course of their investigation." R. 130: 
Tf 2. The court concluded that "[t]he defendant voluntarily stepped outside to speak to the 
officers, which constituted a lawful level one encounter that did not require reasonable 
suspicion." R. 130:1[1. 
On appeal, defendant contends that the discovery of contraband following his arrest 
on the outstanding warrant was fruit of the poisonous tree because the officers did not have 
"probable cause or the exigent circumstances to detain [him]" in the first place. Aplt. Brf. at 
13-14, 19. He claims that absent probable cause, the officers "should not have detained 
[him]," but "should have left him alone." Aplt. Brf. at 15,17. Defendant's claim fails at the 
outset because the trial court concluded that defendant was not detained. R. 130: ^ 1-2. 
The law is well settled that "[i]f there is no detention—no seizure within the meaning of the 
6 
Fourth Amendment—then no constitutional rights have been violated." Florida v. Royer, 
460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983). The officers, therefore, did not need to 
justify their exchange with defendant. 
Although the trial court concluded that defendant was not detained, defendant does 
not challenge that conclusion. He offers no reason, cites no authority, and provides no 
analysis supporting a contrary conclusion. See Aplt. Brf. at 9-19. Instead, defendant argues 
as z/the trial court concluded that the officers detained him and implicitly asks this Court to 
do the same. See Aplt. Brf. at 13-15, 17, 19. This Court will not do so. See State v. 
McGrath, 928 P.2d 1033,1036 (Utah App. 1996) (refosingto disturb trial court's conclusion 
where defendant's analysis does not challenge that conclusion). 
The Utah Supreme Court has time and again emphasized that the appellate court "'is 
not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and 
research.'" State v. Green, 2004 UT 76,113 (quoting State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, \ 6, 1 
P.3d 1108). The rules of appellate procedure require that an appellant's brief "contain the 
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with 
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. P. 
24(a)(9). In other words, the rules require the "development of [ ] authority and reasoned 
analysis based on that authority" supporting a defendant's claim. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 305 (Utah 1998). Where, as here, a defendant does not challenge a trial court's 
conclusion in any meaningful way, this Court will not address it on appeal. McGrath, 928 
P.2datl036. 
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Moreover, the trial court's initial oversight in not entering findings of fact and 
conclusions of law does not excuse defendant's failure to challenge the trial court's 
conclusion that he was not detained. At the suppression hearing, the prosecutor argued that 
the exchange constituted a level one encounter while the defense argued that it was a level 
two detention. See R. 104: 59-60. In its oral ruling denying the motion to suppress, the trial 
court explained that officers may conduct "knock and talks" to determine if a fugitive is 
present, concluded that the officers did so here, and referred to the exchange as a "level one" 
encounter. R. 104: 63-64. In doing so, the trial court found that defendant "willingly went 
outside." R. 104: 63. In other words, defendant was well aware that the trial court denied 
the motion based on its conclusion that defendant was not detained. Yet, defendant did not 
challenge that conclusion on appeal. This Court should not, therefore, address the issue. 
In any event, defendant's claim fails on the merits. His claim fails on two levels. 
First, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant was not detained. And second, even 
if police had detained him, they were not required to support that detention with probable 
cause, as argued by defendant. See Aplt. Brf. at 10-19. 
"[A] seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual 
and asks a few questions." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 2386 
(1991). The United States Supreme Court has emphasized that "even when officers have no 
basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that 
individual, ask to examine the individual's identification, and [even] request consent to 
search . . . —so long as the police do not convey a message that compliance with their 
8 
requests is required." Id. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. at 2386. In this case, the officers simply 
knocked on the door, and when defendant answered, asked if he would step outside and 
speak with them. R. 104: 10-13, 34-35; R. 128-30. He agreed, stepped outside voluntarily, 
and gave his name and date of birth upon the officers' request. R. 104:11-13,35-37; R. 129. 
The officers did not order defendant out of the motor home, display their weapons, pull 
defendant out, or otherwise touch defendant. SeeR. 104:11,35; R. 129. In short, nothing in 
the officers' actions suggested "that compliance with their requests [was] required." Bostick, 
501 U.S. at 435, 111 S.Ct. at 2386.1 
Nor did the warrants check convert the consensual encounter into a level two 
detention. As explained above, the Supreme Court has held that a request to examine an 
individual's identification does not convert a consensual encounter into a detention under the 
Fourth Amendment. See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434-35, 111 S.Ct. at 2386. This Court has 
likewise recognized that "[a] warrant check will not per se escalate the encounter into a level 
two stop" if the officer does not retain the identification or otherwise indicate that the person 
is not free to go about his or her business. Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, ^  13 n.2, 
998 P.2d 274. Here, the officers did not obtain any identification nor did they demand or 
That most people are likely to respond to such a request by an officer is of no 
moment. See INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210,216,104 S.Ct. 1758,1762 (1984) (holding that 
"[w]hile most citizens [may very well] respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, 
and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual 
nature of the response"). 
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otherwise indicate that defendant wait for the warrants check. As such, there was no 
detention. 
Even assuming arguendo that there had been a detention, defendant's claim fails 
because an investigatory detention does not require probable cause, as argued by defendant. 
The law is well settled that a "police [officer] can stop and briefly detain a person for 
investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts 
that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' even if the officer lacks probable cause." United States 
v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S 1, 
30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1884-85 (1968)). Therefore, defendant's claim that the officers lacked 
probable cause does not support reversal. 
Woven into defendant's probable cause claim is a contention that Officers Bruno and 
Bieber "set [him] up for Deputy Englund's discovery of contraband upon him." Aplt. Brf. at 
16. He claims that the officers "concealed the truth from the judge," that is, that when they 
retrieved defendant's shoes, they also retrieved his jacket and "planted the contraband" in the 
j acket. See Aplt. Brf. at 17-19. This claim is nothing more than unsubstantiated conj ecture. 
2
 The trial court made no finding that a jacket was retrieved from the motor home or 
that the cigarette package was found in the jacket. See R. 128-30. At the suppression 
hearing, neither officer remembered retrieving a jacket from the motor home, although 
Officer Bruno admitted that it was a possibility. R. 104:22-23,42. Officer Bruno testified 
similarly at trial. R. 138: 7-8. Officer Englund testified that he found the cigarette package 
in defendant's shirt pocket, but on further inquiry could not confirm whether it was found in 
a shirt or coat pocket. R. 104: 47-48. At trial, Officer Englund testified that defendant was 
wearing a jacket but again could not say whether the cigarette package was found in a shirt 
or coat pocket. R. 138: 12-13. Finally, defendant offered no testimony at the suppression 
hearing indicating that the officers retrieved his jacket. See R. 104: 49-57. 
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Defendant cites no record evidence supporting his theory of a setup, but merely 
questions Officer Bieber's "clairvoyance" in warning him about smuggling drugs into the jail 
and the "suspicious" discovery of contraband at the jail rather than at the scene. Aplt. Brf. at 
16-18. The trial court did not address this factual allegation and this Court is in no position 
to find new facts. See Brigham City v. Stewart, 2002 UT App 317, ffi[ 10-11, 57 P.3d 1111 
(holding that appellate court may not find new facts), cert granted on other grounds, 65 
P.3d 1190. Moreover, defendant affirmatively waived that allegation at the suppression 
hearing. Although defense counsel raised the possibility that the contraband was planted, he 
represented to the trial court that it was not a subject of their motion to suppress. R. 104: 
60. This Court will not address claims affirmatively waived below. See State v. Hall, 946 
P.2d 712,718 (Utah App. 1997) (declining to consider defendant's argument where defense 
counsel affirmatively waived any challenge), cert denied, 953 P.2d 449 (Utah 1998). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction. 
0 
In arguing for suppression, defense counsel stated: "Our position is they searched 
him at the scene, why did they find it at the jail? That's the question that was asked. That 
wasn 't an issue in this motion, and I haven't made it an issue in this motion." R. 104: 60 
(emphasis added). 
11 
Respectfully submitted September 22, 2004. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
TREY S. GRAY 
'Assistant Attorney General 
Counsel for Appellee 
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District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
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Deputy District Attorney 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84190 
Telephone: (801) 468-3422 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED FINDING OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 021906404 
Judge DENNIS M. FUCHS 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED MATTER CAME BEFORE the Court for hearing and 
determination of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, on December 6, 2002 at 10:00 p.m. The 
Honorable Dennis M. Fuchs presided. The Defendant was present and represented by Bruce Oliver. 
The State was represented by Lana Taylor, Deputy District Attorney for Salt Lake County. Based 
upon the memorandums of law submitted and the arguments of counsel presented, and for good 
cause shown, the Court now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On May 3, 2002, Salt Lake City Police Department Officers Bruno and Bieber 
went to a motor home parked next to a warehouse of auto-related businesses in search of a 
suspect in an auto theft. 
2. The officers knocked on the door to the motor home, which was opened by the 
defendant. 
a* 
to'csl District Third 
SALT LAKE COUNf 
.3. Officer Bruno identified himself and asked defendant if he would step outside to 
speak with him. 
4. The defendant agreed and stepped outside on his own volition to talk to them. 
The officers did not touch the defendant at this time and did not pull the defendant out of the 
trailer. 
5. Upon request, the defendant provided the officers with his name and date of birth. 
6. Officer Bruno explained that they were looking for a suspect in an auto theft ring 
and asked defendant whether he knew of his whereabouts. 
7. While Officer Bruno spoke with the defendant, Officer Bieber called dispatch to 
see if defendant had any arrest warrants. 
8. Dispatch informed Officer Bieber that there were warrants for the defendant's 
arrest. 
9. After Officer Bieber notified Officer Bruno of the warrants, the officers placed 
the defendant under arrest. 
10. Officer Bieber frisked the defendant for weapons prior to putting him in the patrol 
car, but found none. 
11. At the defendant's request, the officers retrieved a pair of shoes from the 
defendant's trailer and locked the trailer door. 
12. The officers gave the defendant his keys and his shoes. 
13. The defendant was taken to the Salt Lake County jail where Deputy Englund 
searched the defendant and found methamphetamine in a cigarette package in the defendant's 
pocket. 
14. The officers' testimony at the motion to suppress hearing was credible and is 
hereby adopted. 
DAVID E.YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
LANA TAYLOR, 7642 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JOHN EDWARD YOUNG, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED ORDER 
Case No. 021906404 
Judge DENNIS M. FUCHS 
Based upon the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, it is hereby ORDERED, 
ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied. 




Approved as to Form: 
FROM THE FOREGOING FINDINGS OF FACT, THE COURT NOW MAKES AND 
ENTERS THE FOLLOWING: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The defendant voluntarily stepped outside to speak to the officers, which 
constituted a lawful level one encounter that did not require reasonable suspicion. 
2. The officers did not detain the defendant in the course of their investigation. 
3. The defendant was lawfully arrested on the arrest warrants and was subject to 
search pursuant to arrest. 
4. The search of the defendant at the jail was a lawful administrative search. 
Approved as to Form: 
